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Simplified Models: A Di↵erent Perspective on Models as
Mediators⇤
C. D. McCoy† Michela Massimi†
19 May 2017
Abstract
We introduce a novel point of view on the “models as mediators” framework in order to emphasize
certain important epistemological questions about models in science which have so far been little in-
vestigated. To illustrate how this perspective can help answer these kinds of questions, we explore the
use of simplified models in high energy physics research beyond the Standard Model. We show in
detail how the construction of simplified models is grounded in the need to mitigate pressing epistemic
problems concerning the uncertainty inherent in the present theoretical and experimental contexts.
1 Introduction
The philosophical literature on models in science has drawn attention to a variety of issues of great
importance for understanding the practice of science (Bailer-Jones, 1999; Frigg and Hartmann, 2012),
as numerous case studies attest.1 One of the key insights, emphasized both by Cartwright (1999) and
Morrison (1999), is that a distinctive feature of models is their partial independence from both theory
and data—in a sense explicated by Morrison and Morgan (1999) they mediate between them. Morrison
and Morgan argue that this autonomy is obtained through the construction of models: models are neither
derived from theory nor simple representations of data. It is this autonomy, they claim, that a↵ords us the
possibility of learning from models, whether about phenomena or theory.
Morgan and Morrison’s account emphasizes the construction and representational function of models,
for it is these features of models that they claim ground the autonomy and functions of models. Since
“there are no rules for model building” (Morrison and Morgan, 1999, 31), modeling to some extent
depending on the creativity of model builders or simply being a tacit skill of some scientists (Morrison
andMorgan, 1999, 12), philosophical studies of models tend to begin with a constructed models “in hand”
and proceed to inquire into the practical application of these models or their metaphysics, e.g. their nature,
ability to represent, and how to distinguish them from theories (Frigg and Hartmann, 2012). While these
topics are clearly of philosophical interest, their predominance has resulted in relatively little attention
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and Victoria Martin at ATLAS for discussions during visits to CERN. We also thank Arianna Borrelli, Nora Boyd, Richard Dawid,
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has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and inno-
vation programme (grant agreement European Consolidator Grant H2020-ERC-2014-CoG 647272 Perspectival Realism. Science,
Knowledge, and Truth from a Human Vantage Point).
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being paid to equally important epistemological questions about models (Frigg and Hartmann, 2012, §3),
e.g. how knowledge about models is converted into knowledge about phenomena, why autonomy should
a↵ord the possibility of particular kinds of learning, and why individual models are constructed with
the particular degrees of independence from theory and experiment that they end up having. These last
two questions are the particular ones taken up in this paper, in the interest of contributing to a better
understanding of the epistemological aspects of modeling.
Our starting point for investigating the link between autonomy and learning is to begin with the
simple observation that models may be autonomous from theory and data to varying degrees and in
di↵erent respects. This naturally leads one to wonder what accounts for modelers’ choices in model
construction, since these are the very choices, according to Morrison andMorgan’s account, which should
result in autonomy of a particular degree and respect. Although some degree of creativity and skill is
no doubt required in the construction of models, it is not unreasonable to suppose that there are always
salient, justifiable grounds (albeit context specific ones) which help determine particular choices in model
construction.2
Insight into these grounds can plausibly be obtained by attending to the particular learning aims of
the scientists involved. These aims inform the requisite functions of a model, which then determine (to
some extent) how the model should be constructed. This perspective on models thus neatly reverses the
scheme given by Morrison and Morgan, which moved from the construction of models to their autonomy
to their function as tools of learning. In adopting it here we do not see ourselves as o↵ering a competing
account to Morrison and Morgan’s but rather a complementary point of view on models as mediators.
We illustrate this approach through the use of a particular example drawn from recent work in high
energy physics concerning Beyond Standard Model (BSM) searches at the large hadron collider (LHC)
at CERN. The models that we draw attention to are known as “simplified models”.3 They have seen wide
application in recent years at the LHC’s two main experiments, ATLAS and CMS, since their introduction
in the late 2000s.4 They are perfect examples of “models as mediators”, demonstrating partial autonomy
through their construction and a variety of functions which contribute to their utility in learning about
potential new phenomena and about theory. The multiplicity of their relations to theory and experiment—
to quantum field theory (QFT), the standard model (SM) of particle physics, speculative BSM ideas like
supersymmetry (SUSY), and collider data from the LHC and Tevatron experiments—also permits a study
of the variety and degree of independence from these in concert with simplified models’ various intended
functions. This variety makes simplified models an attractive and nuanced example for illustrating how
modeling choices may be determined and grounded in the larger epistemic context of a particular research
area.
Our principal claim concerning simplified models in this paper is that they are constructed in order to
alleviate certain important di culties posed by the current epistemic context in high energy physics. The
two primary problems faced by BSM searches presently are the lack of reliable theoretical guidance and
the lack of any experimental discrepancies between SM predictions and collider data. One might think
that these circumstances together suggest that BSM physics is a bit of a will-o’-the-wisp, but there are
many reasons (of varying strength) to expect that there is physics beyond the SM, including the existence
of dark matter (Zinkernagel, 2002; Smeenk, 2013), naturalness and the hierarchy problem (Giudice, 2008;
Grinbaum, 2012; Williams, 2015), and unification (Maudlin, 1996; Wayne, 1996; Morrison, 2000; Li,
2In this respect the situation with vis-a`-vis models is more tractable than that vis-a`-vis theories, since models can usually be
situated in a more or less clear theoretical context, whereas situating theories in their wider context (e.g. research programme
(Lakatos, 1970), paradigm (Kuhn, 1996), or research tradition (Laudan, 1977)) can be more di cult, since this context depends on
more nebulous, often implicit ideas like a metaphysical or theoretical core.
3Some work in the philosophy of science has already noted with interest the example of simplified models (Borrelli and Sto¨ltzner,
2013).
4See, e.g. (the ATLAS Collaboration, 2012b, 2015; the CMS Collaboration, 2013). The original paper proposing the idea of
simplified models is (Alwall et al., 2009), building on ideas in (Arkani-Hamed et al., 2007) and related work in (Arkani-Hamed
et al., 2006; Knuteson and Mrenna, 2006; Hubisz et al., 2008).
2
2003). There are various proposals for solving these problems, the most prominent of which is the
assumption of supersymmetry (described in §3). SUSY is a speculative idea which remains empirically
unconfirmed, and the theoretical arguments for it to appear at the relatively low energies testable by the
LHC are not especially strong (although many theoretical physicists do find them compelling). The highly
speculative nature of BSM physics in general means that theory is presently not a reliable guide for BSM
experimental searches at colliders. Thus, where to look and what to look for are quite unconstrained in
such searches, due to the epistemic context of current high energy physics.
This present context contrasts with the circumstances surrounding the search for the SM Higgs, where
there were plentiful data indicating that the SM (of which the Higgs is a crucial part) was correct and
strong theoretical arguments for its existence.5 In other words, where to look and what to look for were
strongly constrained in the case of Higgs search, unlike the present circumstances in BSM searches.
The paper is organized as follows. To begin (§2) we briefly motivate our investigation by introducing
the models as mediators framework and showing how the novel perspective we introduce leads to the
epistemological question we take up in the paper. We then introduce simplified models (§3), explaining
their construction as “incomplete” e↵ective field theories that abstract from various BSM physics sce-
narios and providing a concrete example. In §4 we describe the functions of simplified models from the
perspective of the theoretical physicist and show how simplified models are motivated by epistemic dif-
ficulties on the theory side. In §5 we describe the functions of simplified models from the perspective of
the experimental physicists and show how simplified models are also motivated by epistemic di culties
on the experimental side. The next section (§6) briefly remarks on the application of the ideas presented
in the previous section to epistemic issues concerning Big Data science. We provide some concluding
remarks in §7.
2 A Di↵erent Perspective on Models as Mediators
The principal concern of (Morrison and Morgan, 1999) is to articulate an account of the autonomy—
from both theory and phenomena—of models in order to show how they may function as instruments of
learning. Their account is motivated by the recognition that “there is a significant connection between
the autonomy of models and their ability to function as instruments” (Morrison and Morgan, 1999, 10).
They ground the autonomy of models in their construction and their ability to represent. Accordingly,
the account outlines the four main aspects of models mentioned: their construction, their functioning
(as instruments), how they represent, and how they are used as tools of learning. In this section we
briefly introduce these four components and their connections as presented in (Morrison and Morgan,
1999), then show how to re-orient their account as a way to highlight how learning drives functioning and
construction.
First, a brief overview of how these components are connected in the Morrison and Morgan account.
They begin with model construction, for on their view it is because models are constructed partially from
theory and partially from data that they are partially independent from each. It is precisely in this sense
that they mean models are (partially) autonomous. This autonomy-through-construction allows models to
function, as they say, like a tool or instrument. They also emphasize that a model’s representative capacity
or capability is crucial for it to function autonomously in this way. Finally, they state that learning from
or through a model is facilitated by constructing it and using it. Indeed, they suppose that autonomous
functioning is required for learning about and mediating between theory and world with models. The
following illustration pictures these main components and their direct relations:
5At least the existence of some Higgs mechanism was expected, since there are a variety of ways the Higgs mechanism could be
realized (Borrelli and Sto¨ltzner, 2013). That the simplest realization of the mechanism, the SM Higgs, was the one discovered was
perhaps somewhat surprising (and even disappointing to many theorists, who hoped for the possibility of developing new theory).
Nevertheless, there remains a strong contrast between the hunt for the Higgs (mechanism) and the hunt for Beyond Standard Model
physics on the basis of the di↵erence in reliable theoretical guidance available during the two searches.
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Functioning // Learning
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In short, the Morrison and Morgan account of models indicates how partial independence from theory
and data in the construction of models grounds the autonomous functioning of models, which is necessary
in order to learn from models about theory and data. A model’s capacity to represent the world is also
necessary for its autonomous functioning, but as representation is not particularly relevant to our concerns
in this paper, we will mostly set aside its role in the following.6 Let us therefore prune the previous
diagram slightly to the components that will be of primary interest:
Construction // Functioning // Learning
Morrison and Morgan do not actually provide an argument per se for the claim that autonomy, ob-
tained by construction and manifested in functioning, is necessary for learning. There is a reasonably
straightforward way to understand it, however, and no doubt this is what they had in mind. Consider
first a simple model that divides the epistemic products of science into two categories: theory and data.
The mutual autonomy of theory and data grounds the possibility of learning in the following way. To
subject a theory to test, it must be possible for the data to be consistent with its predictions and it must be
possible for the data to be inconsistent with them. The data must be autonomous with respect to any given
theory, in other words, so that we can learn something about the theory by performing experimental tests,
e.g. whether it is true or at least empirically adequate. Conversely, given some experimental data, some
theories are consistent with it and some are not—empirical data underdetermine theory. The theories are
importantly autonomous with respect to any given empirical data, so we can learn something about the
data by theorizing, e.g. what the data represent or even what data are possible to obtain.
This mutual autonomy, and hence the possibility of learning from it, can be easily extended to the view
of scientific products which includes models: models and theories are mutually independent because (a)
theory does not determine a particular model and (b) particular models underdetermine theory; models
and data are mutually independent because (c) data are not determined by models and (d) particular data
underdetermine models of that data.
Given these comments, it is plausible to suppose that models possess di↵erent degrees and kinds
of autonomy with respect both to theory and to data. What, though, determines the kinds and degrees
of a model’s independence (and dependence)? While some may insist that the construction of a model
is an “art” and nothing can be gained from pursuing an investigation along this line, it is plausible to
suppose that there are at least some relevant epistemic considerations which significantly influence the
construction of models. As said in the introduction, we suggest that the natural starting point is to look
at what scientists hope to learn from their models. This thought motivates re-orienting our perspective on
models as mediators, from the direction highlighted by Morrison and Morgan,
Construction // Functioning // Learning
to the reverse direction:
6One of us (Massimi, M. (2017). “Perspectival Modelling”. Manuscript submitted for publication), argues that simplified models
belong to a large class of what she calls “perspectival models”, whose main function is not to represent the target system. Instead
their representational content is somehow sui generis, as it concerns at best possibilities rather than actual (or even fictional) states
of a↵airs.
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More explicitly, the basic suggestion is that valuable insight into the autonomy and construction of
models is to be had by investigating first what scientists wish to learn from a model. In other words, we
aim to show how scientists’ epistemic goals can (partially) determine how a model should function and
hence how it should be constructed. This does not mean that construction is necessarily a mere pragmatic
matter, however, wholly dependent on the particular aims of individual scientists or groups of scientists.
The relevant aims may be grounded in, among other things, objective assessments of the viability of (or
confidence in) present theories, models, and data, which assessments suggest on what a novel model
should be dependent and of what it should be independent. To elucidate the foregoing ideas, we turn to
our concrete example—simplified models—in the following sections.
3 Simplified Models
Simplified models have emerged in recent years as a useful class of models in high energy physics, par-
ticularly because of how they mediate between the data collected at particle colliders and the theoretical
scenarios explored in BSM physics (as we will explain in the following). A “simplified model” in this
context is an extension of the SM that adds only a couple of new hypothetical BSM particles to the SM,
along with decay chains of these particles into BSM and SM particles (Alwall et al., 2009; LHC New
Physics Working Group, 2012). They are “simplified” because, unlike full BSM models, which typically
introduce numerous particles and decay chains, each simplified model only introduces a small handful of
new experimental parameters to the SM: the masses of the posited BSM particles and a few cross sections
and branching ratios.7 It is important to stress that probably no physicist thinks that a simplified model is
a realistic model of BSM physics.8 For this reason we will distinguish them from (“full”) BSM physics
models, which purport to represent actual physics beyond the Standard Model. Despite being unrealistic,
simplified models do have a certain utility, which is to be explained by their being embedded in relations
of dependence and independence to possible BSM physics and collider experiments.
Physicists expect that BSM particle physics will include both novel phenomena at extremely high
energies (presumably described by some theory of quantum gravity) as well as lower energy phenomena
that may be detectable by the LHC in the near future. The complete and correct underlying BSM theory
(if any such theory indeed exists) presently remains beyond the reach of current physics, both theoretically
and experimentally. For the most basic purposes of particle physics experiments, however, all one needs
is a low energy e↵ective field theory (EFT) that describes particle phenomena at the energies relevant for
collider experiments. The SM, for example, is plausibly a low energy EFT of a higher energy EFT or
full BSM theory. Now, if the complete BSM theory (or at least a higher energy EFT than the SM) was
in hand, then in principle one could construct an appropriate EFT by “integrating out” the undetectable
higher energy particles and modifying the remainder of the theory to account for their e↵ects on the
detectable low energy physics (Cao and Schweber, 1993, 64). Since such is not so in hand, theoretical
physicists generally proceed by developing plausible EFTs on the usual physical grounds, e.g. symmetry
principles and physically reasonable constraints (Bain, 2013). This EFT “philosophy” is widespread in
contemporary physics because it is “a practical and convenient way of proceeding in describing natural
7A cross section in particle physics is an “e↵ective area” that represents the likelihood of a scattering event given the incoming
and outgoing particles. Since di↵erent transitions and decays are possible in particle physics experiments, one also needs to know
the ratios of these di↵erent transitions (what is known as the branching ratio).
8The representational nature of simplified models is an open question worthy of investigation. Although we do not take a
stand on this question here, we note as potentially relevant the idea that models may be “fictional” (Frigg, 2010), “idealized”
(McMullin, 1985; Cartwright, 1989), or even non-representational “false models” (Wimsatt, 1987). For a qualified defense of the sui
generis representational nature of simplified models as modeling possibilities see (Massimi, M. (2017). “Perspectival Modelling”.
Manuscript submitted for publication).
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phenomena” (Castellani, 2002, 265), without the need for developing a fully fleshed out fundamental
theory.9
Simplified models are EFTs, since they do model low energy particle phenomenology, i.e. experi-
mentally detectable particle behavior, in a quantum field theoretic description. Although they are not
constructed on the aforementioned usual physical grounds, they are nevertheless motivated primarily by
theoretical (especially SUSY) considerations and expectations. For this reason they are theory-driven
models, echoing the theory-driven methodology of (a lot of) physics.10 Although experimental consid-
erations drive the construction of simplified models in important ways (described below), they are cer-
tainly not phenomenological models,11 simply because there are presently no recalcitrant experimental
data (vis-a`-vis the Standard Model) upon which to construct one. Thus, being motivated by SUSY phe-
nomenology is quite di↵erent from being a phenomenological model. SUSY phenomenology motivates
the construction of simplified models by suggesting possibly detectable particle signatures which can be
captured in a simplified model. By contrast, phenomenological modeling in particle physics would have
to start from detected particle signatures.
Simplified models are not expected (due to their simplifications) to be candidates to succeed the SM;
they are rather taken to be (in some sense) “incomplete” models. Indeed, no plausible physical principle
would suggest that the correct EFT describing particle phenomenology at the LHC would include just
the particular particles and decay channels of any individual simplified model. It may seem “counter-
intuitive” to construct such “deliberately incomplete models” (Alwall et al., 2009, 2) in this way; nev-
ertheless, our discussion of the functioning of simplified models in the following sections, building in
particular on the original ideas from (Arkani-Hamed et al., 2007) and (Alwall et al., 2009), shows why
simplified models are methodologically sensible to adopt in this exploratory epistemic context. They are,
in short, primarily constructed as heuristic tools.
We emphasize that simplified models are not purely arbitrary constructions. The simplified mod-
els originally introduced in (Alwall et al., 2009), for example, are motivated by SUSY phenomenology
(SUSY models being the most popular among the BSM physics models), as are most of the many simpli-
fied models constructed since (LHCNew PhysicsWorking Group, 2012). Nevertheless, simplified models
are to some extent “model-independent” in the sense that they do not presuppose that supersymmetry ac-
tually exists, nor do they reflect the particular constraints or principles of any particular theoretical model
incorporating SUSY. Indeed, the utility of simplified models does not necessarily depend on the eventual
validation of any SUSY model. Thus, even if supersymmetry turned out to be false, simplified models
would still be useful for characterizing BSM physics, as the particles and decay channels in simplified
models are also relatable to a variety of non-SUSY BSM phenomenology (LHC New Physics Working
Group, 2012). So long as the products of the modeled decays are detectable as hadronic jets, missing
transverse energy, or leptons (all of which are detectable at collider experiments), the SUSY-motivated
simplified models can still be used to characterize BSM phenomenology (Alwall et al., 2009, 1). More
unusual phenomenology that does not fit this mold, lumped together under the label “exotica” in particle
physics, e.g. displaced vertex signatures, lepton jets, “weird” tracks, etc., has also motivated the introduc-
tion of other simplified models besides those motivated from SUSY physics (LHC New Physics Working
Group, 2012, §VII). The guiding idea behind developing the set of simplified models is to cover all the
anticipated BSM phenomenology that is both theoretically possible and experimentally detectable at the
LHC (and other potential collider experiments as well).
Before looking at an example of a simplified model, it will help to say a little about SUSY and
SUSY terminology. Supersymmetry is popular among theoretical physicists and can be motivated in
9For the relation of EFTs to the models-as-mediators framework, see in particular (Hartmann, 2001).
10Pace (Cartwright et al., 1995)). The account from (Cartwright, 1983), where an “unprepared description” of all we know
empirically about the phenomenon under investigation is adapted to theory in a “prepared description”, is inapplicable in cases such
as this one.
11A phenomenological model is a model that is constructed (primarily) on the basis of experimental or observational results, as
opposed to a theoretical model, which is a model constructed (primarily) on the basis of theory.
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several ways—as a solution to the naturalness and hierarchy problem (Giudice, 2008; Grinbaum, 2012;
Williams, 2015), to help with grand unification (Maudlin, 1996; Wayne, 1996; Morrison, 2000; Li, 2003),
to explain dark matter (Zinkernagel, 2002; Smeenk, 2013), etc. In SUSY models, every SM particle has
a partner related by supersymmetry (a “superpartner”), i.e. a particle that shares many of its properties
but di↵ers in its intrinsic spin by one-half.12 Thus each boson (integer spin) has a fermion (half-integer
spin) as a superpartner, and each fermion has a boson as a superpartner. The superpartner bosons’ names
are just the names of the SM fermions preceded by an ‘s’. For example, the electron’s superpartner is
the “selectron” and quark superpartners are called “squarks”. The superpartner fermion’s names are the
names of the SM bosons (subject to slight variation) with “ino” appended. Thus, the gluon’s superpartner
is the “gluino” and the W’s superpartner is the “wino”.
Our first example is a leptonic decay simplified model (Alwall et al., 2009). In this model (Fig. 1) a
proton-proton collision (like those at the LHC) leads to the production of a pair of quark superpartners,
i.e. squarks (labeled “Q” in the figure). These squarks have relatively high mass and are unstable particles,
so quickly decay into further, lower mass decay products. This particular model has four possible decay
channels for the squark. First, the squark may decay into a SM quark (q), which subsequently gives rise
to a detectable jet event in the LHC detector, and an LSP (lightest supersymmetric particle), which is both
stable and “invisible” (its existence would be inferred from the detection of missing transverse energy E,
in the same way that neutrinos, for example, are detected in collider experiments). The squark may also
decay into a quark and, via an intermediate state, a W or Z boson and an LSP. The third possibility is a
decay (via intermediate states) to quarks, leptons (l), and an LSP; the fourth is a decay to quarks, a lepton,
a neutrino (⌫), and a LSP. Each of these four decay channels has a calculable cross-section and the model
has an associated branching ratio, which determines the likelihood of the squark decaying along each of
the four decay chains. There are three (or four) new masses which would be measurable (inferable) in
this model: the mass of the squark (Q), the masses of the intermediate particle state(s) (solid unlabeled
lines in figure), and the mass of the LSP (which would be inferred from the missing energy E).
Figure 1: A leptonic decay simplified model
With this basic introduction to simplified models in mind, it is straightforward to show how simplified
models illustrate the four components (construction, functioning, representing, and learning) of Morrison
and Morgan’s framework and what grounds their construction.13 To begin, simplified models, like the
one described above, are constructed to be autonomous, in that they are both partially independent from
collider data and also partially independent of the details of any specific BSM theory. In an obvious sense,
they are not independent of QFT however—they are QFTs, i.e. models of the general QFT framework.
12One thing that realistic superpartners do not share is the mass of the SM particle, else they would have been detected by now
along with their partner SM particles. Thus, SUSY must be a broken symmetry, if it exists, so that superpartners are able to have
larger masses than their SM partners.
13Cf. also a similar analysis of Higgs models in (Borrelli and Sto¨ltzner, 2013).
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Still, there is also a slender sense in which simplified models are independent of QFT, since simplified
models can potentially be useful for characterizing BSM phenomena that may well not be describable by
QFT, e.g. quantum gravitational phenomena (that is, if it were to somehow have a detectable e↵ect on low
energy physics). Simplified models are also plainly independent of experiment in their construction, for
no BSM phenomena has yet been observed in particle experiments. Indeed, they are modeling particles
which, for all we know, might well prove to be non-existent. Yet there is an important sense in which
the construction of simplified models is driven by experimental considerations. Simplified models are
built in such a way that their parameters are easily relatable to collider observables, viz. particle masses,
cross-sections, and branching ratios.14
As noted in §2, in Morrison and Morgan’s framework the autonomy of models derives (in part) from
their independence from theory and data by construction. Simplified models are indeed partially au-
tonomous in this way. Morrison and Morgan also claim that the autonomy of models derives (in part)
from their representational capacity. Although representation, again, is not particularly relevant to the
argument of this paper, a few remarks on the topic are perhaps called for, as simplified models are of
some interest in this respect as well. Simplified models are, as noted previously, deliberately constructed
to be incomplete models of physics. That alone makes them “idealized models”; they may, however, be
completely wrong-headed in Wimsatt’s sense: “not only are there interactions wrong, but a significant
number of the entities and/or their properties do not exist” (Wimsatt, 1987, 29). This could happen, for
example, if some collision products (jets, leptons, missing energy) well-described by a simplified model
are actually produced through multiple processes, complicated interactions, etc. and not at all via the
simple decay chains of the simplified model. In the case where simplified models are merely incomplete
one has a case for denying that they represent; if they are completely wrong-headed, one has even a
stronger case. On the other hand, it is arguable that simplified models can represent the observed phe-
nomena indirectly and partially (perhaps along the lines suggested in (Bailer-Jones, 2003)). Although we
cannot pursue this issue further here, since our present aims lie elsewhere, these remarks do suggest that
simplified models should be a particularly interesting case to investigate for those interested in debates
on scientific representation.15
4 Theoretical Perspectives on Simplified Models
Much of the current work of theoretical physicists in high energy physics is dedicated either to rethinking
the conceptual foundations of the SM or else to the construction of BSM models.16 Simplified models
can and do play a useful role in these activities. Indeed, the independence of simplified models from BSM
physics and their connection to experiment allows theoretical physicists to learn about BSM physics in
ways that pure theoretical work and empirical data would not necessarily permit. This section demon-
strates how the learning aims of theoretical particle physicists, which are substantially grounded in the
present epistemic context of high energy physics, guide the particular construction of simplified models
to make this kind of learning possible. We start by relating the two main functions of simplified models
relevant to theorizing: (1) ruling out individual BSM models and (2) informing BSM model building.
First function first: simplified models can be used to rule out full BSM models (Alwall et al., 2009,
4). Although direct comparison of a full BSM model with collider data is adequate to this task, simplified
models can facilitate this procedure—a theorist merely has to determine what predictions her model
will make in terms of each simplified model’s carefully selected few parameters to see if her model
is consistent with the data (we describe this procedure in §5), rather than determining which precise
14Alwall et al. (2009) in particular note that a major advantage of simplified models (especially the four they introduce) is that
they are related to important, discriminating collider observables, e.g. mass signatures, and lepton and heavy quark counts.
15For a novel take on this issue please refer to the reference (Massimi 2017) in fn. 6 above.
16Cf. the detailed study of Higgs model building in (Borrelli and Sto¨ltzner, 2013).
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experimental predictions the theoretical model makes for any particular experimental apparatus. Thus
a theorist compares two models rather than a model and data. This is a relatively simple function, one
which is, again, not strictly necessary as theorists can make the latter comparison if they wish.
For this reason the second function of simplified models is more significant. Simplified models can be
used to guide the process of BSM model building. This guidance is potentially manifested in two ways,
viz. in terms of negative guidance (constraints) and in terms of positive guidance.
Concerning positive guidance, in the event of the detection of new BSM phenomena at the LHC, a
best-fit simplified model is heuristically useful for suggesting a corresponding complete BSM model (or
set of models) for the new phenomena. As Alwall et al. (2009, 33) point out, “a reasonable hypothesis
for the new physics is one that is consistent with the simplified model, except that where the data di↵ers
from the simplified model, the hypothesis di↵ers in the same direction.” What they mean, roughly, is
that residual discrepancies between the data and the simplified model (which one would expect, given
that simplified models are not full BSM models) can suggest what additional processes might need to be
included in a more complete model.
As negative guidance, the presentation of experimental data in terms of simplified models reveals
constraints on possible BSM models (see, e.g. (the ATLAS Collaboration, 2015)). If a particular sim-
plified model is ruled out by experiment in some regime (again, we discuss this procedure in §5), then
theoreticians have some evidence that those processes are excluded and have grounds for introducing a
corresponding constraint in their model building. Of course experimental data can be used to determine
such constraints as well. Nevertheless, simplified models do facilitate this function. For one, as they
are theory-driven models they have a more direct relation to full BSM physics models than experimental
data.17 The constraints can therefore be stated in terms of the theoretical framework rather than in terms
of experimental observables. These inter-model relations can then be exploited to rule out entire classes
of BSMmodels that are not consistent with the experimental data (as presented in the guise of a simplified
model).
It is important to note that “ruling out” is actually somewhat too strong of a term to use in this context.
The hypothetical BSM model space is enormous. Particular experimental signatures can be realized in
subtle, complicated ways in full BSM models (including SUSY models). Properly “ruling out” models
thus only applies to BSM models that behave more or less like the simplified models that have been
experimentally excluded. For this reason a theoretical physicist who favors her model for theoretical
reasons may not necessarily be deterred much by a negative result upon comparison with experimental
data expressed in terms of a simplified model—she might in fact rather just see the full experimental data
and draw her own conclusions from them.
Given these functions along with the caveats we point out, it may not seem like simplified models are
really of much value to theoretical physicists, since they can apparently make direct comparisons between
their models and the data and take guidance directly from the data for building new models. This would
misunderstand, however, what the autonomy of simplified models a↵ords in this context. As Morrison
and Morgan emphasize, the autonomy of simplified models is important for them to be instruments of
learning. Simplified models’ crucial function (from the point of view of theoretical physicists) is to
characterize a certain set of particle phenomenology that may be detected at the LHC independently of
any particular BSM scenario and its complicated details. Simplified models are used as tools to inform
physicists about the feasibility of various BSM scenarios they entertain in their model building practice
(either by suggesting promising directions for model building or by indicating unpromising ones). Thus
what one learns from the use of simplified models is something about whole classes of BSM physics—not
merely something about individual BSM models.
Why is this important? The space of SUSY models (let alone the space of possible BSM physics
17Arkani-Hamed et al. note that “...the relation between Lagrangian parameters and observables is often obscure, and Monte
Carlo [simulations] must be generated separately for every point in the Lagrangian parameter space” (Arkani-Hamed et al., 2007,
3).
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models) is huge. Accordingly, there are simply far too many SUSY models to test at the LHC (let
alone BSM physics models in general), so the conventional scientific method of deriving predictions
from a model and comparing those predictions with the experimental data is ine cient and even wholly
impractical in this context.18 If theoretical physicists had strong reasons to pursue particular models with
constrained parameters, then this massive model underdetermination would not be such a problem. But it
has become increasingly clear that BSM theorizing is quite unconstrained—particle physicists no longer
have a reliable guiding model (apart from the general QFT framework) as they did with the SM, and there
are no recalcitrant collider data at present from which to build new phenomenological models.
A natural response to these circumstances is to constrain attention to small parameter spaces. How-
ever the usual approach to theorizing, e.g. by assuming certain simple, intuitive constraints, generally
limits possible phenomenology too much. For example, minimal supergravity (mSUGRA) has only four
parameters, but its assumptions would force strong constraints between parameters in more general mod-
els, strongly limiting possible physical e↵ects in these more complete models. Not only is it unlikely
that mSUGRA itself is correct (it is a “toy model” (Hartmann, 1995)), but, due to its constraining of the
possible phenomenology of full BSM models, the best fit mSUGRA model cannot tell us much about
BSM physics. Other examples are similar; strong theoretical constraints limit parameter spaces, but since
those constraints are likely not preserved in realistic BSM models, the small parameter spaces cannot tell
us much about BSM physics. The same goes for “small”, experiment-friendly parameter spaces like the
constrained minimally supersymmetric standard model (pMSSM).19
The alternative to the theory-driven approach is simply to wait for novel data from collider exper-
iments, build phenomenological models of this data, and then use these phenomenological models to
guide theoretical BSM models. This approach too is rather impractical in this context. There is a massive
range of possible phenomenological models one could generate given significant discrepancies between
the SM predictions and collider data, as it is not clear what physical processes might occur before the
detection event (we revisit this problem in more detail in §5).20
Hence, given the aims of particle physicists and the present epistemic situation (no guidance from
experiment and little from theory), “minimal” theoretical models are needed that are closely tied to the
experiments which particle physicists can currently perform.21 In other words, particle physicists require
a set of models that mediate between theory and experiment, by both having the descriptive capacity to
account for possible experimental signatures while also connecting to possible BSM particle phenomenol-
ogy and BSM theoretical “cores” like SUSY (Borrelli, 2012).
Simplified models fit the bill quite well. They abstract from the details of full BSM models to derive
particle phenomenology that is potentially detectable at the LHC. Because they retain physically signif-
icant relations to full BSM models, data at the LHC can then be used to make inferences about BSM
physics (ruling out, guiding theory development). Key to motivating simplified models is the epistemic
context of high energy physics. Since there is limited theoretical and experimental guidance in BSM
theorizing at present, there is a significant underdetermination of physically plausible models which un-
dermines the application of familiar approaches to theory testing. Limiting this underdetermination is
crucial to make progress, but doing so by imposing constraints severs the epistemic connection between
constrained models and more complete models. On the other hand, any forthcoming data from the LHC
18As noted in the introduction, the situation was quite di↵erent with the search for the Higgs. Physicists have long had strong
theoretical reasons to posit the Higgs mechanism in the context of the SM (Karaca, 2013; Borrelli, 2015) and plausible limits to its
empirical parameters (Barger and Phillips, 1987; Gunion et al., 1990). Thus, to some extent, the Higgs discovery was no surprise at
all for many (Dawid, 2013, 37).
19The minimally supersymmetric standard model (MSSM) is the minimal extension of the SM that realizes supersymmetry. It
introduces over 100 parameters; further constraints can be imposed to make the MSSM more empirically tractable, which reduce
the number of BSM parameters to 19 in what is known as the phenomenological MSSM (pMSSM).
20There have been some attempts to grapple with this “inverse problem” in recent years, which attempts eventually led to the
simplified models program: (Bine´truy et al., 2004; Knuteson and Mrenna, 2006; Arkani-Hamed et al., 2006).
21Similar models have been relatedly discussed under the names “developmental models” (Leplin, 1980) and “exploratory mod-
els” (Gelfert, 2016, Ch. 4).
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would be consistent with a vast array of phenomenological models which may have an inscrutable rela-
tion to full BSM models. Simplified models solve these problems by limiting the underdetermination on
“both sides” while preserving strong links to more complete models and experimental data.
Given these considerations, it is worth remarking that the role played by simplified models can only
be understood as part of the dynamical processes of science (Hartmann, 1995). Simplified models are
(in Hartmann’s terms) model “substitutes for theory”, since they provide some temporary explanatory,
descriptive, and heuristic resources in circumstances where the underlying theory being unknown. In-
deed, considered in isolation of their historical and epistemic context simplified models’ relevance and
importance would be entirely opaque (because they are deliberately incomplete models). Recalling the
discussion of §2, attention solely to the details of simplified models’ construction (i.e. that simplified
models are EFTs with a handful of parameters beyond the SM, etc.) and their use as tools (ruling out full
BSM models, etc.) overlooks the importance of how the context in which they are situated elucidates the
scientific role that they play.
5 Experimentalist Perspectives on Simplified Models
The aspects of simplified models relevant for experimental practice have already been hinted at above
whilst discussing the theoretical perspective. In this section we discuss these aspects in further detail
from the experimental perspective. We begin with a specific example to illustrate this perspective and
then distill three important experimental motivations for their development, drawing on ideas in (Alwall
et al., 2009), (Alves et al., 2011), and (LHC New Physics Working Group, 2012).
We focus our attention on a particular simplified model, one of those abstracted from a certain SUSY
process, to illustrate the experimental functions of simplified models. This specific BSM scenario is
just one among several others that the CMS Collaboration (2016) has been investigating. The relevant
process for this model (Fig. 2) involves the products of a proton-proton collision at the LHC decaying
into a pair of squarks (a top squark (t˜) and its antiparticle (¯˜t), which in turn decay into a top quark (t) and
its antiparticle (t¯) and two neutralinos ( ˜01). This is (one decay chain of) a simplified model where the
only relevant BSM phenomenon is the production of the top squark and its antiparticle and their decays
into detectable SM particles (the quarks decay into jets of hadrons) and missing energy (the neutralinos).
The Feynman diagram of this simplified model (like any simplified model) abstracts from any other kind
of BSM particle production that might go on in proton-proton collisions. Indeed, it abstracts from all the
other relevant theoretical parameters at work in SUSY models with the exception of masses and cross-
sections of the top squark and the neutralino, as described in §3.
Figure 2: Production of a top squark/anti-squark pair that decays into a top quark/anti-quark pair and
a pair of LSPs (reproduced from (the CMS Collaboration, 2016), copyright CERN/CMS 2016, under
license CC BY 4.0)
Experimentalists look for signal regions where they know from the SM what the background of de-
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tector events will be and where the simplified model suggests that novel detector events may be distin-
guishable from the background. So, for example, if 10 background events are expected on the basis of
the SM and 20 events are observed in that signal region, then this excess of events might be the sign of
new BSM physics (depending of course on statistical considerations).22 The first step in this procedure is
to map the background: this is done both via Monte Carlo simulations and also via control regions. The
latter are well-known regions within the Standard Model where no new signals are expected, and they are
regularly used to test the reliability of the Monte Carlo simulations themselves used in the signal region.23
The signal region where this decay process may be revealed in the data is identified in such a way so as to
enhance as much as possible the signal and reduce as much as possible the background. Experimentalists
can then check for any deviation in this signal region from the expected background. This is done by
translating the Feynman diagram of the simplified model in Fig. 2 into the graph of Fig. 3, which shows
the hypothetical production rate for the top squark/anti-squark pair decaying into the LSP for a range of
possible mass parameter values in GeV for both particles.
Figure 3: Graph showing exclusion region for simplified model consisting of the top squark and its
antiparticle decaying into LSPs (reproduced from (the CMS Collaboration, 2016), copyright CERN/CMS
2016, under license CC BY 4.0)
In the example under consideration the mass of the top quark t is known but neither the mass of the
hypothetical LSP nor that of the top squark is known. Thus, the simplified model associated with Fig. 2
is rendered in the diagram as a convenient 2-parameter model, which maps these two unknown masses
of putative BSM particles into a region where their production rate could be measured against the SM
22Some of these considerations concerning the statistical methodology of high energy physics have recently been discussed by
Dawid (2015, 2017), Cousins (2017), and Staley (2017).
23These procedures are in most respects similar to those carried out during the initial runs of the LHC when searching for the
Higgs. See (Franklin, 2017) for an accessible description of the experimental procedures of the LHC during the Higgs discovery.
(Morrison, 2015) and (Massimi and Bhimji, 2015) discuss the role of simulation in LHC experiments.
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expectations and collider data. To achieve this goal, it is of course important that the new signatures for
top squark and LSP production di↵er in relevant ways from the signature of the top quark as well as from
other well-known signatures within the Standard Model that might be relevant for this signal region.
Fig. 3 shows how ranges of possible mass values for the top squark (horizontal axis) and LSP (vertical
axis) in this simplified model fare with respect to observation (solid lines) and the expected Standard
Model background (dotted lines). This kind of graph depicts whether a deviation, i.e. an excess of events,
which might be the signature top squarks decaying into the LSP, has been detected in this parameter
region. In this particular case it ultimately tells us that no evidence for top squarks decaying into LSPs
has been found—for this simplified model the parameter region below the dotted lines (SM expectations)
and the solid lines (data) is statistically excluded. Experimentalists therefore conclude that to these limits
this simplified model has been ruled out.
The example illustrates in more detail some aspects of the functions discussed in §3, viz. to (1) rule out
BSM models and (2) provide guidance in model building. It also illustrates how simplified models have
two important functions for experimentalists. Simplified models can be used to (3) interpret experimental
data and (4) assess experimental search procedures. A third function is also important: simplified models
can be used to (5) compare experimental data from di↵erent colliders or experiments in an experiment-
independent way. We discuss these latter three functions and their associated aims in turn.
The first experimentally relevant aim of developing simplified models is to have tools which can be
used to interpret new data at the LHC.24 In other words, simplified models play a useful role in answering
the question of what the data represent. Data models alone cannot provide such an interpretation, for
the detector events cannot have an unambiguous interpretation in theoretical terms, i.e. kinds of particles
and decay processes. Detector events merely register that something (with certain physical properties)
triggered the detector. As noted previously, many conceivable BSM physical processes are compatible
with and may result in the same detectable events. Simplified models supply a transparent, easy-to-use
interpretation of experimental data in terms of new particles (their cross-sections and branching ratios) or
their absence, and hence a means to characterize the data obtained by the detectors at the LHC (albeit a
characterization that may significantly distort the nature of the real underlying physical processes). Since
simplified models focus on experimental observables (masses, branching ratios, cross sections), it is easy
to compare data with simplified models and check for any eventual excesses in the expected SM events
that might be the signature for new possible BSM particles. The data can then be presented in terms of
simplified models (alongside more typical presentations such as signature-based results and comparisons
of data to benchmark models, e.g. the constrained or phenomenological MSSM), as has been standardly
done in numerous reports from the ATLAS and CMS experiments at the LHC since 2011.
This function of simplified models, viz. as interpretations of new experimental signals, allows ex-
perimentalists to learn something about the results of their experiments and the phenomena responsible
for them. Because simplified models are deliberately incomplete models and hence plausibly may not
directly represent the phenomena, experimentalists likely cannot learn precisely what is causing their
data. Nevertheless, simplified models allow experimentalists to give some contentful physical character-
ization of what is causing their data. Moreover, they can give one that connects to plausible complete
BSM models (as described in §4). Although this characterization may distort the actual facts to some de-
gree (even completely), it does not preclude learning some important physical facts about the underlying
phenomena.
The second experimentally relevant aim of developing simplified models is to evaluate and revise
experimental search strategies. As simplified models are designed to capture a complete range of expected
BSM particle phenomenology, they can be used to reveal potentially overlooked particle phenomenology
in standard search strategies (LHC New Physics Working Group, 2012, 4). Initial BSM searches at the
24Simplified models provide “a useful starting point for characterizing positive signals of new physics” (LHC New Physics
Working Group, 2012, 2); “if an excess of...events is seen in LHC data, a theoretical framework in which to describe it will be
essential to constraining the structure of the new physics” (Alwall et al., 2009, 1).
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LHC were based primarily on strategies developed for Standard Model searches (searches for the Higgs
in particular) or extended strategies appropriate for particular benchmark models, e.g. the MSSM (Alves
et al., 2011). Such strategies may however be inadequate to revealing other (non-MSSM or non-SM-
like) BSM physics, giving rise to an important source of experimental risk, namely that the LHC may be
producing BSM particles which remain undetected because of the particular search strategies employed.
Assessing the experimental signatures of a wide range of simplified models in relation to the sensitivity
of LHC search strategies can suggest needed strategy modifications and particular experimental searches
worth undertaking. The need for autonomy from experiment and a degree of model-independence for this
aim is evident.
The third experimental application of simplified models is to compare experimental data from dif-
ferent experiments. For example, in our Fig. 3, the exclusion region marked by the solid black line can
be compared with exclusion limits found in other BSM searches at ATLAS that have been focusing on
the top quark using a di↵erent methodology. Simplified models are useful for this task because they are
independent of any particular experiment (Alwall et al., 2009, 2). Experimental data from di↵erent ex-
periments may be di cult to compare directly, due to di↵erent experimental methodologies, setups, etc.
Combining data sets from di↵erent experiments is obviously important, and there are, naturally, various
statistical methods employed to do just this in all areas of science.25 Theory-driven models, unlike such
statistical methods, have the advantage, however, of supplying a unified interpretive locus for making
direct comparisons. In particular, “simplified models provide a figure of merit for comparing searches at
di↵erent collider experiments, because the kinematics and cross-sections expected for a simplified model
at di↵erent colliders can be computed from their fundamental parameters” (LHC New Physics Working
Group, 2012, 24). This is certainly not to say, however, that statistical methods for combining data are
inferior to theory-driven comparisons; it is just to point out that the uncertainties involved in the two
approaches are di↵erent, so what one can learn from each data-comparison approach is di↵erent—and
potentially mutually informing.
In concluding this section, we emphasize that, since they are independent of particular collider exper-
iments, simplified models allow experimentalists to learn something about the phenomena in a partially
experiment- and data-independent way (while still of course providing an interpretation of the data). This
is important because data from a collider experiment may be dependent in various ways on the exper-
imental apparatus and methodology, i.e. ways which do not directly represent the physical phenomena
being studied. Comparisons of data are useful precisely because they can uncover the presence of these
dependencies. Since simplified models may function as tools of data comparison, they can be used to re-
veal the underlying phenomena, shorn of irrelevant distortions from the nature of the experiment. Each of
these three experimental functions of simplified models—data interpretation, assessment of experimental
methodology, and data comparison across di↵erent experiments—depend on the relative independence of
simplified models from experimental data. As simplified models are constructed to be autonomous in this
sense, they function autonomously in the three aforementioned ways, i.e. as tools for learning specific
things about the data and the experiment.
6 Big Data and BSM Searches
We turn in this final section to connecting our discussion of simplified models with wider epistemological
issues raised by so-called Big Data. We do this not to introduce any new considerations beyond those
discussed already, but only to illustrate what has been said so far in relation to a topic increasingly of
interest to philosophers of science. We intend this brief discussion to present our account in a slightly
di↵erent light, as well as to situate it in an interesting and relevant context.
25As an example of the methodology used in particle physics, the Tevatron and LHC experiments’ first joint results are presented
in (the ATLAS Collaboration et al., 2014).
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Indeed, high energy physics is often presented as one of the areas in contemporary science where Big
Data and its related epistemological issues arise. Data-intensive science is an extremely broad domain of
inquiry arising in informatics, social sciences, physical sciences and life sciences. Only recently philoso-
phers of science have begun to focus their attention on data-intensive science, with a focus primarily on
machine learning, biology, and the social sciences, e.g. (Floridi, 2012; Leonelli, 2014; Pietsch, 2016).
Although a precise definition is elusive, data-intensive science can be and has been characterized in terms
of the sheer amount of information handled and the technological challenges it poses for data acquisition,
data storage, and data analysis.
Adding to some of the concerns that philosophers of science have already raised about the episte-
mological novelty of Big Data, in e.g. biology (Leonelli, 2012), the epistemic challenges we have been
discussing in the search for BSM physics in high energy physics can be characterized as a distinct Big
Data issue, one which simplified models are intended to address. The challenges, recall, are both that
BSM physics is highly underdetermined by empirical data, and that available theoretical considerations
do not presently provide much guidance on what BSM physics we should expect. These challenges be-
come exacerbated by the Big Data environment of the LHC. In the social sciences which involve Big Data
the main challenge, e.g. in microtargeting (modeling voters’ behavior to make polls), is modeling a great
quantity of discrete, well-defined, and easily identifiable demographic data, e.g. age, race, gender of the
voters (Pietsch, 2016). In biomedical sciences the main challenge consists in collating a large volume of
decontextualized yet still well-defined and easily identifiable data, e.g. appearance, behavior, breeding,
about given species of organisms (e.g. over a thousand in the case of drosophila), storing the data, and re-
using it for various purposes (Leonelli, 2008, 2012). But in high energy physics the problems connected
to high volumes of data go beyond the classification, organization, storage and re-use of data (although
these are certainly present).
It might be tempting just to think that the Big Data challenge is the same here as elsewhere. That is,
the challenge in high energy physics is the problem of tracking a high-volume of data representing parti-
cles impinging on various particle detectors. While this is certainly a challenge, it is a challenge that has
been adequately solved at the LHC—at least for the search for the Higgs. The SM could be used to sug-
gest some plausible constraints on where to look for its experimental signature (mass ranges, important
decay chains where the Higgs would appear before decaying into detectable events, etc.). This led to the
development of particular search strategies, where certain detector events were ignored (either in hard-
ware or through software “triggers” (Karaca, 2017)) in response to practical limitations in data storage
capacity and processing rates at CERN. Since physicists knew (more or less) what they were looking for,
they were able to optimize their search to find it. And indeed, they did find it (the ATLAS Collaboration,
2012a; the CMS Collaboration, 2012).
Unlike in biomedical science or social science with their identifiable data, in BSM searches, where
the aim is to discover new physics, the problem of transient underdetermination (Sklar, 1981) of theory
by data arises. For every data pattern detected at the CMS or ATLAS experiments at CERN, there is,
as mentioned above, a multiplicity of possible BSM particles and decay channels that might have led to
exactly the same data pattern (be it the pattern of a signature/ excess of events vis-a`-vis background).
Since decisions have to be made, however, about which data to keep and which data to throw away (due
to the quantity of data produced in collisions) and since scientists do not have much guidance in where
precisely to look for data signatures that would suggest new physics, the Big Data problem is importantly
di↵eent in high energy physics (and naturally in other exploratory contexts as well).
Our point has been that simplified models follow a modeling strategy which mitigates this problem
to some extent. Simplified models essentially undercut the underdetermination problem by the way they
mediate between theory and experiment. Theory first provides some guidance in what to look for by
suggesting theoretically-motivated phenomenology. This guidance is turned into model substitutes for
theory, viz. simplified models. These models then can be used to optimize searches for these kinds of
phenomenology, mitigating the problem from Big Data. Given experimental data, they can next provide
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a tool for interpreting experimental data. Interpreted in terms of a simplified model, the data can finally
be used to rule out full BSM models and suggest guidance on model building. If there is BSM physics,
this procedure provides a realistic method for finding it, characterizing it, and eventually settling on a
physically plausible BSM model. Thus simplified models solve the “Learner’s Paradox” problem in the
usual way: one does not have to know precisely what one is looking for; one just has to know what one
is looking for well enough in order to progress.
7 Conclusion
The novel perspective on the “models as mediators” framework introduced in §2 usefully emphasizes the
importance of certain epistemological questions which have so far been little investigated in the philo-
sophical literature on models in science. In this paper we focused on the question of why models are
constructed to have the autonomy from theory and data that they do. We suggested that this question can
be helpfully addressed by looking to the learning aims of scientists who make use of them. These aims
provide clues as to what determines the degree of independence and dependence that a model has with
respect to theory and data. We argued that the epistemic context of a research area plays a crucial role in
determining the needed autonomy of a model.
To illustrate these ideas we presented the case of simplified models from high energy physics research.
Simplified models address two major epistemic di culties faced by physicists searching for beyond stan-
dard model physics.
The first is a serious underdetermination of theory by evidence (both empirical and otherwise). This
underdetermination is not the logical underdetermination familiar in philosophical debates, but the kind
relevant for making methodological decisions in science, viz.‘`transient” (Sklar, 1981) or “scientific”
(Dawid, 2013) underdetermination. There are a variety of theoretical options currently available, but
the lack of confidence in any individual model means there is little consistent guidance available for con-
ducting experiments, and testing all the possible models would be massively ine cient and impractical.
The second is an analogous “underdetermination”, namely of data patterns by possible BSM physics
theories. Of course, insofar as one believes the Standard Model is correct, then there is no underdeter-
mination: the SM tells us exactly what we should expect to see in the future, which is nothing new at
all. But there is a variety of reasons to suppose that there should be BSM physics. Without interpretive
guidance from theory, experimentalists do not exactly know what they are looking for—or at, should
they see a new signature in the data. One might think that they can simply run the collider and look for
discrepancies between SM predictions and the data, but the amount and complexity of the data make the
situation somewhat more challenging than this. Experimentalists need theoretical guidance so that they
know where to look in the enormous amounts of data for potential new phenomena.
We have argued that simplified models can help solve these two problems by mediating between
theory and data. To mitigate the transient underdetermination faced in high energy physics, it is natural
to follow the EFT philosophy and attend to low energy EFTs relevant to the experimental capacities
of the LHC. As EFTs, simplified models are dependent on the theoretical framework of QFT, but they
abstract from complete BSM physics models, such as SUSY models, because of physicists’ uncertainty
about BSM physics. BSM physics models do, however, suggest a range of particle phenomenology that
the LHC could detect. Each simplified model corresponds to some plausible phenomenology, although
no model by itself is physically plausible as a complete BSM physics model. Because of their clear
theoretical connections to more complete BSM physics models, simplified models can be used to rule
out (or at least disfavor) the latter, as well as suggest plausible constraints and guidance for future model
building (of complete models).
Simplified models also mitigate the epistemic di culties on the experimental side. They provide
a ready interpretation of the data in terms of particles and experimentally accessible parameters. As
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they cover the range of plausible particle phenomenology, they can be used to assess the sensitivity of
experimental search strategies to potentially observable discrepancies between the SM and data. (We
also noted the value of having a simple tool for comparing data from di↵erent experimental apparatuses.)
The independence of theory-driven models (like simplified models) from the data (which is characterized
merely in terms of detector events) is clearly necessary for these particular interpretive, evaluative, and
comparative functions.
We therefore conclude that the construction of simplified models is substantially based in attempting
to solve salient epistemic problems faced by physicists in searching for BSM physics. Simplified models
are constructed to be independent from theory and data, i.e. autonomous, but also dependent on them
in particular ways and to particular extents precisely because of these circumstances. By expanding our
attention beyond the details of the model to the larger theoretical and experimental context, we see that
the learning goals of physicists are based substantially on these epistemic considerations, which then
determine the needed functions of the set of models, and hence what autonomy must be “built into”
them. Although we do not expect all cases to mirror our own in their particulars, as what is epistemically
relevant in each context surely varies, insight into scientific methodology and practice can likely be gained
by investigating the issues we have related here in other cases.
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